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Police interrogation methods in the United States have evolved over the past one hundred years 
as a direct result of public condemnation of violent police practices as well as decisions of the 
Supreme Court on constitutional challenges to police interrogation practices.  Professionalization 
of police agencies from the 1940s to present has resulted in the use of standardized interrogation 
methods based on behavioral psychology, scientific methods, and advances in technology.  





Police interrogation methods have evolved over the past one hundred years in the United States 
as a direct result of public condemnation of violent police practices as well as decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court on constitutional challenges to police interrogation practices.  
Professionalization of police agencies from the 1940s to present has resulted in the use of 
standardized interrogation methods based on behavioral psychology, scientific methods, and 
advances in technology.  
Police interrogation tactics of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries were 
brutally violent.  The police interrogation practices of inflicting mental suffering and/or physical 
pain to extract information from suspects became collectively known as the “third degree” (Leo 
2008).  Although it is widely assumed that the third degree borrowed it name from secret 
Masonic initiation rituals, Thomas and Leo (2012) note that a New York Times article published 
in 1901 refers to three degrees of police interrogation.  The first degree of interrogation involved 
questioning of a suspect by police officers at a local precinct station.  The second degree of 
interrogation was more formal and conducted by a police detective in a police court overseen by 
a magistrate.  When more intense interrogation tactics were needed to elicit a confession, the 
third degree of interrogation was employed using whatever tactics the chief of the detective 
bureau deemed necessary and appropriate.  Most police scholars and historians cite to the 
Wickersham Commission’s (1931) report on police lawlessness as the watershed moment where 
the American public was put on notice as to the widespread third degree interrogation tactics at 
police departments across the country.  Thomas and Leo (2008) found that contemporaneous 
newspaper accounts from the 1870s through the 1920s often provided stories with rich depictions 
of various third degree interrogation tactics used by police in large cities and small towns across 
the United States.   
The Wickersham Commission (1931) report on police lawlessness concluded with a 
number of propositions on third degree interrogation tactics.  Interrogation involving the 
infliction of mental and physical pain to extract confessions from suspects and statements from 
witnesses were widespread in American law enforcement agencies across the country.  Physical 
brutality was routinely part of third degree interrogations.  Sometimes third degree interrogation 
sessions lasted many hours and were specifically designed to overcome a suspect’s resistance.  
The Commission also found that third degree interrogation strategies were tailored to a suspect’s 
age and intelligence to maximize the level of intimidation invoked by police interrogators.  It 
was not uncommon that prolonged periods of secret detention were used to conduct third degree 
interrogations.  Third degree interrogation tactics utilized torture psychological games that 
sometimes resulted in false confessions where suspects told police interrogators whatever they 
wanted to hear and sign statements without even reading the alleged confession written by 
detectives.  The false confessions were often obtained after third degree tactics that included 
sleep deprivation and withholding food from suspects being questions for days at a time.  
Police interrogation methods dramatically changed in the years that followed publication 
of the Wickersham Commission (1931) report on police lawlessness during a period of increased 
professionalism in law enforcement.  The public was no longer willing to tolerate third degree 
interrogation tactics of the police.  Law enforcement leaders including August Vollmer and J. 
Edgar Hoover advocated for the use of scientific and psychological methods in police 
interrogations that would render the third degree unnecessary.  Polygraph machines, commonly 
referred to as lie detectors, were developed in the 1930s and 1940s to provide more effective 
methods of interrogation.  Polygraph examiners were viewed as impartial operators of the 
behavioral lie detection machines, but the success of the polygraph machine was in the ability of 
polygraph examiners to elicit confessions from criminal suspects.  Polygraph exam results are 
not admissible as evidence in courts and often the examiners lied about the results of a test as 
part of the psychological manipulation strategies used in the interrogation process.  The typical 
polygraph examination consists of three parts.  The first is a pre-examination interview where the 
examiner explains to the suspect that the interview questions establish a baseline so that the 
polygraph machine will be able to determine truthfulness in the suspect’s answers to questions 
that are asked during the polygraph examination.  The second part is the actual polygraph 
examination, and third part is the post-examination interview.  It is not uncommon for a 
polygraph examiner to advise the suspect that they “failed” the polygraph even when there is no 
support for that in the results from the examination.  Often a polygraph examiner will say things 
like “I’m going to leave the room for a few minutes, and when I return you are going to need to 
come clean and tell the truth.”  Amazingly, the most common result is that when the polygraph 
examiner returns to the room a short while later, the suspect willingly confesses to a crime.  In 
these instances, the suspect wrongly concludes that the machine results would be somehow used 
to gain a conviction, so they might as well confess now.  These types of behavior lie detection 
interrogation tactics were common for much of the twentieth century and into current times. 
Over the past 80 years American police agencies developed a variety of psychological 
manipulation strategies also designed to elicit confessions from criminal suspects.  In the 1940s 
and 1950s a number of police training manuals on the science of interrogation were developed 
by Fred Inbau, John Reid, and others.  New editions of those manuals and texts are published 
periodically and still widely used today (see, e.g., Inbau et al. 2013).  The interrogation training 
manuals served several purposes.  The manuals were designed to elevate interrogation practices 
to standards of police professionalism, which in great part was meant to restore the public’s trust 
in law enforcement agencies that had been severely damaged by the public disclosures by the 
Wickersham Commission on third degree interrogation practices.  The training manuals on 
interrogation methods were also designed to standardize police training on interrogation 
practices to comply with the legal standards on voluntariness of confessions obtained through 
police interrogation promulgated by the Supreme Court in case opinions during the 1940s 
through the early 1960s.   
Police in the United States are often trained on Reid’s nine-step interrogation process.  
Reid’s nine-step process of interrogation methods has been revised and expanded in various texts 
since first introduced in the 1940s and has adopted more manipulative and deceptive practices of 
interrogation methods over the past thirty years designed to gain psychological advantage over a 
suspect being interrogated.  Reid’s nine-steps of interrogation are: 
• Step 1: Direct, Positive Confrontation 
• Step 2: Theme Development 
• Step 3: Handling Denials 
• Step 4: Overcoming Objections 
• Step 5: Procurement and Retention of a Suspect’s Attention 
• Step 6: Handling the Suspect’s Passive Mood 
• Step 7: Presenting an Alternative Question 
• Step 8: Having the Suspect Orally Relate Various Details of the Offense 
• Step 9: Converting an Oral Confession into a Written Confession 
 
(Inbau et al. 2013).  The nine-step process relies on psychological processes of isolating the in-
custody suspect, directly confronting the suspect of the certainty that he or she committed the 
crime in question and blocking the suspect’s efforts of denial, and minimizing the crime in an 
effort to elicit a confession from the suspect.  The Reid interrogation techniques are utilized 
without distinction as to whether the suspect being interrogated is a juvenile or an adult.  Feld 
(2013) notes that the Reid interrogation method does not account for developmental differences 
between adolescents and adults and the vulnerabilities an adolescent might experience when 
being interrogated by the police. 
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against compulsory self-incrimination.  
The Court enumerated a seven-part set of procedural safeguards to protect the privilege against 
self-incrimination.  The police must notify a suspect in custody of these procedural safeguards 
before they can interrogate the person.  Prior to custodial interrogation, a suspect must be warned 
that he or she has the right to remain silent, that any statement made may be used as evidence 
against him or her, that he or she has right to the presence of an attorney before any questioning, 
and that an attorney will be provided if he or she cannot afford one.  In an attempt to override 
Miranda, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §3501 which provided that voluntary confessions are 
admissible in federal courts.  The Supreme Court held in Dickerson v. United States (2000) that 
Section 3501 is unconstitutional noting that Miranda is a “constitutional rule.”   
In the years leading up to Miranda, the Supreme Court had twice addressed issues 
concerning police interrogation of juveniles in Haley v. Ohio (1948) and Gallegos v. Colorado 
(1962).  Both cases were resolved by the Court as under a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
standard of voluntariness in answering police questions.  In Haley, a 14 year-old boy was denied 
access to a lawyer while being questioned by the police in an all nightlong interrogation until he 
confessed when confronted with statements made by co-defendants.  The boy was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to life in prison.  In overturning his conviction, the Supreme Court held 
that special care must be made in scrutinizing the record in analyzing the voluntariness of a 
police interrogation of a child.  In Gallegos the Court again applied the Fourteenth Amendment 
standard of voluntariness in the case of a 14 year-old boy who was questioned about a robbery in 
a lengthy interrogation without an attorney or his parents present.  Here, again, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the confession that resulted in the child’s conviction was obtained in 
violation of the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court addressed the post-Miranda issue of custodial interrogation of 
juveniles in Fare v. Michael C. (1979).  Michael C., then 16 ½ years old, was taken into custody 
on suspicion of murder.  Prior to being questioned by police he was advised of his Miranda 
rights.  The juvenile, who was on probation and previously served a term of incarceration at a 
youth corrections camp, asked to speak with his probation officer.  When the request was denied 
by the police, Michael C. said that he would speak with police officers without consulting with 
an attorney.  He then proceeded to provide a statement and draw sketches that implicated himself 
in the murder.  Later his attorney moved to suppress the incriminating statements and sketches 
on the grounds that Michael’s request to speak with his probation officer before questioning 
constituted an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and to remain 
silent.  The trial court denied the request to suppress the evidence.  The California Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the juvenile’s request for his probation officer was a per se violation 
of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda.  The California Supreme Court’s holding was 
based on their view that a juvenile probation officer holds a position of trust and that California 
law requires that probation officers represent the juvenile’s interest.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the California Supreme Court erred in finding that the denial of the juvenile’s request 
for his probation officer was a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda.  
The Supreme Court further held that the whether incriminating statements and sketches were 
admissible on the basis of a waiver was a question to be resolved by a review of the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of the juvenile.  
More recently, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011), the Supreme Court held that a child’s 
age and youthfulness is an objective factor that must be part of an analysis of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation and, given those circumstances, whether a reasonable person 
would have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave in determining if 
a suspect was “in custody” when being questioned by the police.  The Supreme Court more 
specifically explained that a child’s age is different than other personal characteristics that have 
no objectively discernable relationship to a reasonable person’s understanding of whether they 
were free to not answer a police officer’s questions and leave and that a child’s age properly 
informs a Miranda custody analysis.  The juvenile, J.D.B., was a 13 year-old seventh-grade 
student at a middle school when he was removed from his classroom by a uniformed police 
officer, escorted to a closed-door conference room at the school, and questioned by police for at 
least half an hour in the presence of two police officers and two school administrators.  At no 
time during the question was J.D.B. advised of his Miranda rights against self-incrimination.  
The Supreme Court noted that a child’s age would not be determinative or even a significant 
factor in every case.  It is precisely because of the totality of the circumstances in the 
schoolhouse interrogation by police officers in a closed-door conference attended by school 
administrators that necessitates the objective analysis as to whether the juvenile was “in 
custody.”  J.D.B. ultimately stands for the proposition that a child’s youthfulness makes him or 
her susceptible to vulnerabilities that an adult would not experience in an in-custody police 
interrogation. 
Some states require that a parent be present to assist their child when being interrogated 
by the police.  At least one state’s court of last resort has long required the use of a simplified 
Miranda rights form for juveniles to ensure that an in-custody interrogation of a juvenile only 
occurs after a juvenile has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her privilege 
against self-incrimination.  In State of New Hampshire v. Benoit (1985) a 15 year-old juvenile 
was arrested and, while in custody, advised of his constitutional rights and privilege against self-
incrimination by a police officer who read the rights from the police department’s standard 
Miranda form used for adults.  The juvenile waived his rights and provided an incriminating 
statement to police.  He was later indicted for armed robbery and certified to stand trial as an 
adult.  Benoit’s attorney filed a pretrial motion to suppress the incriminating statements made by 
the juvenile to police.  The motion was denied and after a jury trial the juvenile was convicted 
and sentenced to prison.  On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the conviction 
and remanded the case for a new trial.  The Court held under the Constitution and the New 
Hampshire Constitution that the juvenile had not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
waived his rights and recommended that police use a simplified juvenile rights form when 
interrogating juveniles in custody.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that its holding 
would not put an end to controversies surrounding juvenile waivers of constitutional rights, but 
that the Benoit holding provides concrete procedures for police officers to follow in the future 
which will safeguard children in New Hampshire from unknowing and unintelligent waivers of 
their constitutional rights against self-incrimination.  
Five decades after the Miranda decision still little is known about how police questions 
suspects (Feld, 2013, 2014, Leo, 2008, Thomas & Leo, 2012).  Only limited empirical research 
has been published on police interrogation methods and most people know very little about the 
techniques and strategies that police use to elicit confessions from criminal suspects.   King and 
Dunn (2010) found that information on police interrogation methods designed to detect 
deception is inaccurate and misleading in numerous popular criminal justice textbooks.  
Advances in scientific methods and use of technology such as video cameras to record police 
interrogations are being utilized in many police departments to reduce the likelihood of false 
confessions. 
SEE ALSO: Competence, Legal Rights; Due Process for Juveniles; Fare v. Michael C.; Juvenile 
Due Process Rights; Miranda v. Arizona; Police. 
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